Hoyer v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Hoyer v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bridget K. Romano; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Stephen D. Spencer; Nathan Whittaker; Day, Shell & Liljenquist; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ryan Hoyer v. State of Utah, No. 20080103 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/706
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RYAN HOYER and RICHARD HOYER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20080103-SC 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 040916063 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANTHONY 
QUINN, PRESIDING 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E. 300 S. 6TH FLOOR 
PO BOX 14 0856 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0856 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
STEPHEN D. SPENCER 
NATHAN WHITTAKER 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST 
45 E. VINE ST. 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
ATTORNEYS FOR £|P_ggLLANT 
UTAH APPELLArE COURTS 
JUN 2 0 200B 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RYAN HOYER and RICHARD HOYER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No. 20080103-SC 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 040916063 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANTHONY 
QUINN, PRESIDING 
BRIDGET K. ROMANO 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E. 300 S. 6TH FLOOR 
PO BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-0856 
STEPHEN D. SPENCER 
NATHAN WHITTAKER 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST 
45 E. VINE ST. 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities 3 
Jurisdictional Statement 5 
Issues and Standard of Review 5 
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 6 
Statement of the Case 6 
Summary of Argument 9 
Argument 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THE GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT REQUIRES MORE THAN A SHOWING OF 
"BUT-FOR" CAUSATION FOR THE STATE TO RETAIN IMMUNITY 10 
A. Interpreting the term "arises out of" as requiring only a 
showing of but-for causation is an incorrect reading 
of the statute and should be rejected 11 
B. The proper standard for determining whether an injury 
arises out of an excepted activity or condition is whether 
the injury is integrally related to the excepted activity 
or condition 17 
C. The negligent acts of State employees in this case were not 
integrally related to the judicial proceeding and 
therefore are not immune from suit 21 
Conclusion 23 
Proof of Service 25 
Addendum 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-301 (1953 as amended) A-l 
Order Granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment A-4 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 
(Colo. 1995) 18 
Barry v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 299 
(Minn. App. 1986) 18, 19 
Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 94 9 5, 10, 13, 20 
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 
888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994) 15 
Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance, 2004 UT 104 15 
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Gilbert, 124 Idaho 953, 
866 P.2d 976 (Idaho App. 1994) 18, 19 
Johnson v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 2006 UT 15, 
133 P. 3d 4 02 5, 13 
Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 235 N.W.2d 42 
(Mich. App. 1975) 19 
National Farmers Union Property & Casualty v. Western Casualty 
& Surety, 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978) 15, 17 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, SI 11, 10 P. 3d 346 12 
Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 927 P.2d 159 
(Utah 1996) 13, 15, 17, 20 
United Services Automobile Association v. Ledger, 
234 Cal. Rptr 570 (1987) 19 
Viking Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661 
(Utah App. 1996) 15, 18, 19 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-301 6, 11, 14, 15-16, 21, 22 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 5 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56 5 
3 
OTHER SOURCES 
William L. Prosser, Law of Torts §41 (4th ed. 1971) 14 
4 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is proper in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the District Court erred in granting Defendant's 
motion for summary judgment by holding that a State agency's 
negligent destruction of a person's property arises from a 
judicial proceeding when the property came into its possession 
pursuant to a search warrant executed several months before the 
negligence occurred. 
Summary judgment should be granted only when ''there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
When reviewing whether the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment, the appellate court reviews the legal conclusions of 
the trial court for correctness. Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, 
18, 48 P.3d 949. A trial court's interpretation of a statute is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Id. In reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, the Court views the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Utah 
Dept. of Transportation, 2006 UT 15, 5 15, 133 P.3d 402. 
Appellants originally raised this issue in their Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. at 342-47), 
preserving the issue for appeal. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30d-301 (1953 as amended by Laws 2004, 
c.267, § 13—See addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Ryan Hoyer is an amateur herpetologist. He 
assists his father, Appellant Richard Hoyer, in research 
centered on a species of snake commonly known as the rubber boa 
{Charina bottae). Richard Hoyer, a retired secondary school 
science teacher, has been researching and recording data on the 
rubber boa for over 40 years and has devoted thousands of hours 
and spent thousands of dollars in the process. He has coauthored 
a number of publications with professional herpetologists. His 
research centers on all life-history aspects of the rubber boa 
(C. bottae.) 
In June 2002, "Operation Slither" was started as a joint 
investigation between the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
and the United States Fish and Wildlife Services. Operation 
Slither was intended to target individuals who were involved in 
the illegal possession and commercial trade in reptiles. In 
October of 2003, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service pulled out 
of the Utah portion of this investigation, leaving the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources to continue their investigation 
alone. 
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Even though Ryan Hoyer is not a commercial trafficker in 
the illegal reptile trade, the Division of Wildlife Resources 
(DWR) targeted his research for investigation. On January 9, 
2004, a search warrant was executed at the home of Ryan Hoyer 
(85 E. 2275 S. Clearfield, Utah) by DWR officers. Among the 
items seized was a computer, various documents and approximately 
65 common rubber boa snakes of the species C. bottaer all of 
which subsequently perished in the possession of DWR. 
As of August 2004, twenty six (26) of the approximately 
sixty-five (65) snakes had died in the possession of Defendants 
as far as Appellants were aware. On October 16, 2006, pursuant 
to an order from the Clearfield City Justice Court (Case No. 05-
8178), Appellants had opportunity to inspect the seized snakes 
that were held at DWR offices in Salt Lake City. On that 
occasion, Appellants learned that of the snakes seized on 
January 9, 2006 (approximately 65 total) all but eight (8) were 
dead by that time. 
While the snakes have been in possession of Utah DWR, 
Richard Hoyer has made numerous communications and attempts to 
travel to Utah in order to provide expert assistance and 
training to Utah DWR for the care of the snakes. Richard Hoyer 
has offered to provide care for the snakes or provide other 
expert care by a third party. These offers were declined by Utah 
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DWR and as a result, most if not all of the snakes eventually 
died while in the care and possession of Utah DWR. 
Appellants filed suit against the State of Utah and the 
State employees involved in the seizure and subsequent care of 
the property, alleging negligence among other claims. On 
September 11, 2007, the State moved for summary judgment on the 
negligence count, claiming that Appellants' injuries arose from 
a judicial proceeding (the issuance of the warrant) and the 
State was therefore immune from suit under Utah Code Ann. §63-
30d-301 (5) (e) (R. at 304-14). The State argued that but for the 
warrant, the snakes would not have been in their possession and 
therefore, no injury could have occurred (R. at 310-14). 
Appellants timely submitted a memorandum in opposition to the 
State's motion on September 18, 2007, arguing that Appellants' 
injuries did not arise out of the issuance of the warrant but 
rather their negligence, which occurred sometime after, and was 
not in any way necessitated by, the issuance of the warrant (R. 
at 342-47, 374-78). 
Judge Anthony B. Quinn heard oral argument on the State's 
motion on November 20, 2007, and granted summary judgment for 
the State in an order dated December 13, 2007 (R. at 379,380-
84). Judge Quinn's order held that the State was immune from 
suit and stated that "but for the actions taken by the State 
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pursuant to a judicial proceeding, plaintiffs would not have 
suffered injury." (R. at 382). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The purpose of the Government Immunity Act was to allow 
private citizens to hold the State accountable for its 
negligence. The district court's application of a NNbut-for" test 
in determining whether an injury arises out of an excepted 
activity or condition under the Government Immunity Act is a 
flawed interpretation of the Act. It is not only doctrinally 
incoherent and counter to the stated purpose of the act, it 
would also free the State from any duty to care for property 
that it has seized for evidentiary purposes. This interpretation 
would mean that private citizens must rely on the good graces of 
the State to safeguard their property. That cannot be what the 
Legislature intended in passing the Act. 
A better test for whether a negligent act is excepted from 
liability under the Government Immunity Act is a two-part test: 
first, if the excepted activity or condition is a direct cause 
of the injury, there is immunity from suit under the Act. 
Second, if the excepted activity is not the direct cause of the 
injury, then a court should determine whether the negligent act 
or omission that a plaintiff claims proximately caused its 
injuries was integrally related to the excepted activity or 
condition. This test is similar to the tests for "arises out of" 
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in other areas of the law and sets limits on liability so that 
the exceptions do not swallow the rule. 
The negligent acts of State employees in this case were not 
integrally related to the issuance of the search warrant. This 
Court should hold that the State does not retain immunity under 
the Government Immunity Act. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY ACT REQUIRES MORE THAN 
A SHOWING OF "BUT-FOR" CAUSATION FOR THE STATE TO 
RETAIN IMMUNITY. 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address the 
matter of jurisdiction. Appellants refer the Court to their 
memorandum in opposition on the matter and choose to rest on the 
arguments as laid out therein. Appellants reserve the right to 
make additional arguments in its reply brief if the State 
includes any additional arguments in its brief. 
In order to determine whether a governmental action is 
shielded from liability, the Court must undertake a three-part 
test to assess "(1) whether the activity is a governmental 
function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the 
particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to 
that waiver." Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44 at 5 10. In this 
case, both parties have conceded that steps 1 and 2 have been 
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satisfied (R. at 382); the only question is whether there exists 
an exception to the waiver of immunity under the Act. 
A. Interpreting the term ''arises out of" as 
requiring only a showing of but-for causation is 
an incorrect reading of the statute and should be 
rejected. 
As provided in the Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (5) ,1 immunity 
for a negligent act or omission of a governmental employee 
committed within the scope of employment is not waived if "the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from" one 
of several listed activities or conditions. The activity under 
which the State claims an exception is subsection (5)(e), which 
excepts from immunity any injury arising out of "the institution 
or prosecution of any judicial . . . proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause [.]" The prosecution of a 
judicial proceeding relied upon by the State in this case is the 
issuance of a search warrant by the Second District Court (R. at 
312, 343, 353). The issuance of the warrant led to its execution 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 was recently amended by Laws 2007, 
c.357. While there are no substantive differences in the 
applicable portions of the law as it currently exists and as it 
was at the time of the time the action accrued, the 2004 version 
is the version applicable to this case and all citations in this 
brief will be to that version. See the Addendum at A-l through 
A-3 for the complete 2004 version of the statute. 
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and the seizure of the snakes from Appellants. But for the 
seizure of the snakes by the State, the State would not have had 
them in their possession and so the negligence would not have 
taken place. Appellants do not challenge that the issuance of 
the search warrant was a part of a judicial proceeding; 
Appellants only challenge that their injury "arose out of" the 
issuance of the search warrant.2 
Appellants have consistently denied that the snakes were 
actually used as evidence in a criminal proceeding. Ryan Hoyer 
was tried for violations of the Wildlife Code in Clearfield City 
v. Ryan Hoyer, case no. 05-8178 in the Clearfield City Justice 
Court on October 17, 2006, and a trial de novo on his conviction 
was held on May 3, 2007, case no. 071600163 in the Second 
District court in and for Davis County. While photographs of the 
snakes were introduced, the snakes themselves were never 
introduced into evidence at either trial. Appellants did not 
challenge the district court's declaration that the snakes were 
used as evidence in the order (R. at 382) because it was not a 
factor in either his ruling or the State's argument in favor of 
summary judgment. The district court's conclusion was plain 
error and should not be considered as an undisputed fact in 
deciding this appeal. S^ e State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 1 11, 10 
P.3d 346. 
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This Court has previously explained that the phrase "arises 
out of" in the Government Immunity Act as meaning "originating 
from, growing out of, or flowing from," and requiring "only that 
there be some causal relationship between the injury and the 
risk." Taylor v. Ogden City School Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 163 
(Utah 1996); Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at 5 15 (stating that the 
phrase "arise out of" requires only "that there be some causal 
nexus between the risk and the resulting injury.") While this 
Court has held that "arises out of" means something less than 
proximate cause, it has not had occasion to decide or explain 
how attenuated the causal relationship must be before an injury 
no longer arises out of a cause that triggers an exception to 
the waiver of immunity under the Government Immunity Act.3 
The district court's interpretation of "arises out of" as 
requiring only a showing of but-for causation is contrary to the 
clear purpose of the statute and so should be rejected by this 
Court. First, only requiring the State to show but-for causation 
3
 While Blackner contains language suggesting that this Court 
reads "arises out of" as but-for causation, 2002 UT 44 at 11 15, 
the issue of how to interpret the phrase was never raised by the 
parties on appeal, and arguments as to the proper interpretation 
of the phrase "arises out of" have not been heard by this Court 
so far as Appellants are aware. 
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would make the statutory waiver of immunity meaningless. As was 
pointed out by Prosser, a but-for test is no test at all: 
At most, [but-for causation] must be a rule of 
exclusion . . . . It should be quite obvious that, 
once events are set in motion, there is, in terms of 
causation alone, no place to stop. The event without 
millions of causes is simply inconceivable; and 
causation alone can provide no clue of any kind to 
singling out those are to be held legally responsible. 
William L. Prosser, Law of Torts §41 (4th ed. 1971) (emphasis 
added). A but-for test sets no limits on the amount of time 
elapsed, the physical distance, the number of intervening acts, 
or how remote the causal relationship can be between the act 
that would give immunity to the State and the injury suffered by 
the potential claimant. In fact, using a strict but-for 
causation test, all negligent acts of government are immune from 
suit. But for enabling legislation (which falls squarely within 
the definition of a discretionary function immunized by 
subsection (5)(a)) the State would have no power to act. 
Likewise, a but-for test would allow the State to claim immunity 
under subsection (5)(h) if it showed that the offending 
governmental entity was financed by taxes. After all, but for 
the collection of the tax, the governmental entity could not 
function and the claimant's injury would not have occurred. 
While these are arguments are taken to the logical extreme, they 
illustrate the absolute necessity of articulating a standard 
beyond but-for causation in interpreting the phrase "arises out 
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of" in this statute. "To do otherwise would allow the exception 
to swallow the rule." Cf^ _ Johnson, 2006 UT 15 at 519. 
Other appellate court precedents support the idea that more 
than but-for causation is required. The definition of "arises 
out of" used in Taylor comes from National Farmers Union 
Property & Casualty v. Western Casualty & Surety, 577 P.2d 961, 
963 (Utah 1978), a liability insurance case. Subsequent 
decisions interpreting "arises out of" in the context of 
liability insurance have held that the "causal nexus requirement 
is more than xbut-for' causation, but less than legal, proximate 
cause." Viking Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661 (Utah App. 
1996). This comports with an ordinary reading of the term 
"arises out of," and the interpretation of "arises out of" in 
other contexts. See Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance, 
2004 UT 104 5510-11, (interpreting "arises out of" in the Utah 
Survival Statute and holding that the statute "taken as a whole 
and in context" should be interpreted more narrowly than 
applying strict "but for" causation); Commercial Carriers v. 
Industrial Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 712 (an injury arises out 
of employment if the conduct that caused the injury is "closely 
entangled" with the employment.). 
Another clue showing that Defendant's interpretation is not 
what the Legislature intended is found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30d-301 (2) (c) . This subsection provides that immunity is waived 
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for "any action based on negligent destruction, damage, or loss 
of . . . property while it is in the possession of any 
governmental entity or employee, if the property was seized for 
the purpose of forfeiture . . . ." The direct implication of 
Defendant's interpretation is that governmental entities or 
employees could not be liable for any negligent damages to 
property seized pursuant to a warrant. That would mean that the 
police have a duty of care on property seized for forfeiture, 
but no duty of care for property seized as evidence. This is an 
inconsistent and absurd result that could not have been intended 
by the Legislature. 
Finally, the disastrous public policy consequences of 
Defendant's interpretation can allow us to safely assume that 
the Legislature did not intend for immunity to apply in this 
case. As mentioned above, the effect of Defendant's 
interpretation would be to declare that the government has no 
duty to care for any property that was seized pursuant to a 
search warrant. The police would then have no duty to feed 
animals seized by search warrant; they could essentially lock an 
animal in a closet if they do need the animal to remain alive as 
part of presenting their case. While declaring this conduct 
legal is appalling enough, it could potentially also allow for 
horrendous abuses of police authority. While an extreme example, 
one could imagine a scenario in which the police, in seeking to 
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punish a suspect who "got off on a technicality/' could easily 
destroy property in a way to make it difficult to prove that 
their conduct was intentional. It is highly unlikely that the 
Legislature would give the police a tool to subvert the 
safeguards of criminal procedure. 
B. The proper standard for determining whether an 
injury arises out of an excepted activity or 
condition is whether the injury is integrally 
related to the excepted activity or condition. 
To determine what standard should apply to determining 
whether an injury arises out of an excepted activity or 
condition, and is thus immune from suit, this Court should look 
again to the context of insurance contracts. As mentioned 
earlier, the definition of "arises out of" used in the context 
of the Government Immunity Act comes from cases interpreting the 
same phrase in insurance contracts. See Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163 
(quoting National Farmers Union, 577 P.2d at 963). The Utah 
Court of Appeals has already considered the question of the 
proper standard for whether an accident "arises out of" the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a car. Their analysis is a 
helpful guide in crafting a standard for the context of the 
Government Immunity Act. 
While it is universally accepted that an injury arises out 
of the use of a car when the injury is sustained while the 
insured is driving the car (i.e. the use of the car is the 
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direct cause of the accident), courts have ruled that activities 
beside operating the vehicle that proximately cause injuries 
arise out of the use of a car and so are covered by insurance. 
In Viking, the court of appeals determined that causal nexus 
required to satisfy "arises out of" was a standard of causation 
more than but-for causation but more than proximate causation. 
927 P. 2d at 664. The court held that "the causation test does 
not require that the insured vehicle itself be the source of the 
injury, only that the use be integrally related to the 
claimant's activities and the injury at the time of the 
accident." Id. At 665 (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. 
McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1995). The court also rephrased 
the test as whether the act proximately causing the injury was a 
''natural and reasonable consequence" of the use of the vehicle. 
Viking, 927 P.2d at 664 (quoting Barry v. Illinois Farmers Ins. 
Co., 386 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. App. 1986). 
Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Gilbert, 124 Idaho 953, 
866 P.2d 976 (Idaho App. 1994), one of the cases relied upon by 
the Court of Appeals, provides further instruction. In reviewing 
cases from sister states, the Idaho court held that an injury 
does not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle if there is an 
"event[] of independent significance which broke the causal link 
between the use of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted." 
Gilbert, 124 Idaho at 959. This is another way of phrasing the 
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test in Viking — whether the intervening events between the use 
of the vehicle and the injury were integrally related to the use 
of the vehicle. 927 P.2d at 665. An event has independent 
significance in the insurance context if it is unrelated to the 
use of the vehicle for transportation purposes. Gilbert, 124 
Idaho at 959. Thus, injuries caused by a battery did not arise 
out of the use of an automobile, even though the events that 
provoked the battery were committed during the use of an 
automobile. United Services Automobile Association v. Ledger, 
234 Cal. Rptr 570 (1987); Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 
235 N.W.2d 42 (Mich. App. 1975). However, slipping on ice while 
entering an automobile, Barry v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 
386 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. App. 1986), and being struck by a car 
while in the process of repairing one's own car, Viking, 927 
P. 2d 661, are not events of independent significance and so the 
injury would arise out of the use of a vehicle. 
This formula can be easily applied to the government 
immunity context. The test for whether a negligent act is 
excepted from liability under the Government Immunity Act is a 
two-part test: first, if the excepted activity or condition is a 
direct cause4 of the injury, there is immunity from suit under 
Here, direct cause refers to the proximate cause of the injury, 
even if the cause was a foreseeable intervening cause that would 
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the Act. Second, if the excepted activity is not the direct 
cause of the injury, then a court should determine whether the 
negligent act or omission that a plaintiff claims proximately 
caused its injuries was integrally related to the excepted 
activity or condition such that the act or omission was a 
natural or reasonable consequence of the excepted activity or 
condition, or whether the act or omission constituted an event 
of independent significance that would break the causal link 
between the excepted activity or condition and the injury. 
The government immunity cases already decided by the Utah 
appellate courts easily fit within this framework. For example, 
When a student is injured when he was pushed through a glass 
window by another student on school property, the injury was 
directly caused by a battery and therefore, the State is immune 
from prosecution. See Taylor, 927 P.2d 159. When a person 
injured by an avalanche caused by the negligent acts of State 
employees in managing a previous avalanche, the State is immune 
from liability because (a) the avalanche was a natural condition 
on the land and the direct cause of the injury, and (b) the 
negligent act in managing the first avalanche was integrally 
related to the first avalanche. Blackner, 2002 UT 44. 
not cut off liability in a suit for negligence against a private 
individual. 
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The judicial proceeding exception listed in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30d-301 (5) (e) would immunize the State from acts in which 
the judicial proceeding was the direct cause of the injury, such 
as imprisonment, civil fines, or the costs of defending against 
a frivolous lawsuit, as well as immunizing the State for 
negligent acts that occurred after the judicial proceeding but 
were integrally related to the judicial proceeding, such as 
negligently arresting the wrong person incident to an arrest 
warrant. However, the Legislature did not intend to give State 
employees immunity from suit for all negligent acts that are 
connected, however remotely, to a judicial proceeding. 
C. The negligent acts of State employees in this 
case were not integrally related to the judicial 
proceeding and therefore are not immune from 
suit. 
Applying the test explained above to the present case, the 
negligent acts of State employees are too remote to the judicial 
proceeding to be integrally related to that proceeding. First, 
the issuance of the warrant was not the direct cause of 
Appellants' injuries. The negligent acts of State employees 
occurred well after the issuance of the warrant. The question 
then becomes whether the State's activities after the issuance 
of the search warrant were integrally related to the issuance of 
the search warrant. 
21 
The failure of the State to take reasonable care of the 
snakes while in their custody is not integrally related to the 
issuance of the warrant and therefore there is no immunity. 
State employees had observed the snakes dying, they were offered 
help and advice in caring for the snakes from either Appellant 
Richard Hoyer or a third party, and they refused. When a party's 
negligence is pointed out to her and she persists in her 
negligence, that act constitutes an event of independent 
significance that breaks the chain of causation because it 
constitutes gross negligence. After being put on notice of their 
failure to properly care for the snakes, any further acts of 
negligence are willful and reckless and would constitute gross 
negligence. Because of the willful nature of these grossly 
negligent acts, they should be deemed to break the chain of 
causation per se. In this way, it would be clear that the State 
has a minimal standard of care for property in its custody. 
Secondly, activities related to the custody of items seized 
are not integrally related to the issuance of a search warrant. 
As pointed out before, the Government Immunity Act imposes an 
ordinary standard of care for the State's handling of property 
seized for forfeiture purposes under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d~301 
(2)(c). There is no rational basis for distinguishing property 
held for forfeiture purposes and property held for evidentiary 
purposes. Therefore, the law should be read to impose an equal 
22 
duty of care for property held for forfeiture purposes and 
evidentiary purposes. 
Finally, the negligent acts of State employees in caring 
for the snakes were too remote in time and place from the 
issuance in the search warrant to be considered integrally 
related. While the Act may grant immunity, that immunity cannot 
last beyond a reasonable timeframe in which the direct 
consequences of the judicial proceeding would occur. To hold 
otherwise would give the State no duty to care for a person's 
property in its custody, no matter how long the State holds that 
property. As mentioned earlier, this conclusion would allow for 
police misconduct with no civil recourse. That is something that 
the Legislature did not intend, and this Court should construe 
the law in a way to discourage police misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The Government Immunity Act should not be read to give the 
police no duty to care for property seized as evidence. The 
Legislature intended for the Act to give private citizens a 
safeguard for their property beyond the good graces of the 
State. This Court should reverse the decision of the district 
court and remand for further proceedings. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of June, 2008. 
Narhan whirtaker 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions. 
(As amended by Laws 2004, c.267, §13) 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any contractual obligation. 
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations are not subject to the requirements of Sections 63-
30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, or 63-30d-601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for 
failure to deliver water from a reservoir or associated facility 
authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, 
if the failure to deliver the contractual amount of water is due 
to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition that 
causes a deficiency in the amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession 
of, or quiet title to real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or 
other liens on real or personal property, to determine any 
adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an 
adjudication about any mortgage or other lien that the 
governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal 
property; 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, 
damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property while 
it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, 
if the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under 
any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(1), as to any action 
brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, of the 
Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the 
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action 
brought to recover attorneys' fees under Sections 63-2-405 and 
63-2-802; 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah 
Protection of Public Employees Act. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity 
from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury 
caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public 
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building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement. 
(b) Immunity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of 
any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public 
improvement. 
(4) Immunity is waived as to any injury proximately caused 
by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within 
the scope of 
employment. 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not 
waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the injury arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise 
or perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, 
infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or 
by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, 
any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable 
cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is 
negligent or intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob 
violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled 
lands, any condition existing in connection with an abandoned 
mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the 
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(1) research or implementation of cloud management or 
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seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(m) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural 
disasters; 
(n) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or 
storm systems; 
(o) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being 
driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6a-208; 
(p) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous 
materials or hazardous wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place 
where emergency medical assistance can be rendered or where the 
person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
(q) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise 
or perform, any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 10, Board 
of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or 
(r) unauthorized access to government records, data, or 
electronic information systems by any person or entity. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RYAN HOYER, RICHARDS F HOYER, 
Plaintiffs, 
V 
STATE OF UTAH, JIM KARPOWITZ, 
RICHARD ASHCROFT, RUDY 
MUSCLOW, MILES MORETTI (in their 
official capacity as officials fo the Utah 
DWR), 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No 040916063 
Judge Anthony B Quinn 
Procedural Background: This case arises out of the State of Utah's (the "State" or 
"defendant") seizure of plaintiffs' snakes pursuant to a search warrant executed upon plaintiff 
Ryan Hoyer Plaintiffs assert that the State was negligent m carmg foi the snakes and assert 
damages for the value of the snakes 
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On Septembc] 11, 2007, the State filed its Motion for Summary Judgment cus to Plaintiffs' 
Negligence Claim, along with a supporting memorandum, in which the Stale asserted that 
plaintiffs' negligence claim against the State was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301 (5)(e) 
of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30(1-101, et. seq. (the 
"Immunity Act")), because their alleged damages arose out of "the institution or prosecution of 
[a] judicial proceeding." Plaintiffs filed a responsive memorandum on September 18, 2007. The 
State filed a reply memorandum on October 1, 2007. 
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment The matter was submitted for decision, 
and a hearing took place on the State's Motion on November 20, 2007, at 8:30 a.m. Barry G. 
Lawrence and Matthew D. Bates, Assistant Attorneys General, appeared on behalf of the State; 
Stephen Spencer appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs. At the conclusion of oral argument, and 
having considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties, and the argument of counsel, the 
Court granted the State's Motion. 
The Court specifically Rules as follows: 
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, the following facts are 
undisputed: 
1. Plaintiffs' snakes were seized by the State pursuant to a search warrant that was 
issued by Judge Glenn Dawson of the Second District Court. 
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2. The Snakes were used as evidence in criminal proceedings against plaintiff Ryan 
I-Joyer in both Davis County Justice Court and Clearfield City Justice Court. 
3. All of plaintiffs' claimed damages result from the seizure of the Snakes; but for 
the seizure of the Snakes, plaintiffs would not have suffered any damages. 
For purposes of the State's motion for summary judgment, this Court makes the 
following conclusions of law: 
1. The State's actions in seizing plaintiffs' snakes and prosecuting plaintiff Ryan Hoyer 
were governmental functions for which the State is immune absent a waiver of immunity. This is 
not disputed by plaintiffs. 
2. For purposes of this Motion, the State has admitted a waiver of immunity herein. 
3. An exception to that waiver of immunity exists in this case, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e)? because plaintiffs' injuries all arose out of the institution or prosecution 
of judicial proceedings. The term "arises out o f has been construed broadly by the Utah 
Supreme Court and only requires that there be some causal nexus between the judicial 
proceeding and plaintiffs' injuries. But for the actions taken by the State pursuant to a judicial 
proceeding, plaintiffs would not have suffered injury. Accordingly, an exception to the waiver 
of immunity exists in this case. 
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4. Therefore, the Slate is immune from all of plaintiffs' claims of negligence in tins 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(e) ofthc Governmenta] Immunity Act of 
Utah. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim is 
granted. 
2. Accordingly, all of plaintiffs' negligence claims against the State are hereby 
dismissed, on their merits and with prejudice. 
3. As this Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiffs and the State of Utah, 
the Court hereby dismisses the State as a defendant in this matter, with prejudice. 
DATED this day of November, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE ANTHONY B. QUINN 
District Court Judge 
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Civ P., I caused to be served by fax transmission, a true and correct copy of foregoing 
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